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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to assess di¤erences in the levels of cost
e¢ ciency of bus lines operated under competitively tendered contracts
and performance-based negotiated contracts. Following the revision of
the Swiss railways act in 1996, regional public authorities were given the
choice between two di¤erent contractual regimes to procure public pas-
senger transport services. We directly compare the impact of competitive
tendering and performance-based negotiation by applying a stochastic fron-
tier analysis to the complete dataset of bus lines (n=630) operated by the
main Swiss company (Swiss Post) at the same time (in 2009) throughout
the country. The overall results show that the di¤erences in the levels of
cost e¢ ciency between the two contractual regimes are not signicant. Our
ndings are in line with recent evidence of cost convergence between com-
petitive tendering and performance-based negotiation, and suggest that the
practice of using both contractual regimes is challenging for the operators
in terms of competitive pressure. The threat of competitive tendering may
have a disciplining e¤ect on negotiation since it prevents bus companies
from bargaining inadequate rents and inducing asymmetric information
advantages.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, competitive tendering for the provision of public bus services
has become a common mean to induce competitive pressure between public or
private monopolies in passenger transportation. The idea goes back to Demsetz
(1968), who argues that competition for the market is the only way to enhance
e¢ ciency when competition in the market is not possible. Many countries ap-
plying some form of competitive tendering have been so far successful. Unit
costs decreased by about 20%, as compared to those of an unchallenged public
monopoly (Preston, 2005). Recent evidence also suggests that rms selected
under competitive tendering exhibit higher total factor productivity (Boitani
et al., 2013). On the other hand, passengerssatisfaction with trips increased
only slightly relative to regions without competitive tendering (Mouwen and
Rietveld, 2013). Hence, the impact of competitive tendering is still partially
unclear, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. As suggested by
Armstrong and Sappington (2006), many advantages of competitive tendering
can be obtained by yardstick competition. The success of competitive tendering
depends on numerous factors (e.g. organizational features, playing rules, num-
ber of competitors, institutional setting), and careful attention must be paid to
the design of crucial aspects (Nash and Wolan´ski, 2010).
The literature is rich of studies on the e¢ ciency of public transportation in-
dustries under di¤erent contractual regimes (tendering vs. negotiation). How-
ever, only few studies try to isolate the e¤ects of changes in the contractual
regime from other simultaneous changes or organizational di¤erences. The re-
sults are frequently weakened due to an identication problem. To the best
of our knowledge, no empirical study has examined di¤erences in the level of
cost e¢ ciency of bus lines operated under competitively tendered contracts and
bus lines operated under performance-based negotiated contracts. The current
study aims at lling this gap in the literature on public transportation services
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by assessing the impact of competitively tendered contracts introduced for bus
lines in Switzerland.
The Swiss public passenger transportation industry underwent a fundamen-
tal reform with the revision of the Railways act (EBG, 1957) and its legal or-
dinances in 1996. The reform rearranged the nancing schemes and introduced
some market mechanisms, similarly to other countries. The main purposes were
to enhance productivity, to improve customer satisfaction and service quality,
and to keep public transport services a¤ordable. According to the revised act,
regional public authorities were given the choice between two di¤erent contrac-
tual regimes to procure public transport services: to put lines out to tender or
to rely on performance-based negotiated contracts.
During the last fteen years, public authorities in several Swiss regions have
exercised their right to put bus lines out to tender. According to Swiss author-
ities (Bundesversammlung, 2010), this measure is believed to have heightened
e¢ ciency and quality levels. However, despite the possibility to put bus lines
in a competitive tendering process, the majority of bus lines are procured un-
der performance-based negotiated contracts. The impact of this policy change
has not yet been evaluated by means of an econometric methodology. For this
purpose, we suggest the use of a total cost frontier approach, which exploits
cross-sectional data from more than 500 bus lines operated by the leading bus
company in Switzerland (Postbus), that provides bus line services under di¤er-
ent contractual regimes after the reform.
As with respect to previous studies, we improve the analysis of the impact of
the contractual regime on cost e¢ ciency in many directions. First, we exclude
the e¤ects on costs stemming from institutional changes such as the privatization
or corporatization process on the contractual regime. This is because we use
data on bus lines operated by Postbus in 2009, a division of the public company
Swiss Post, which turned into a limited liability company in 2006. According to
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Cambini et al. (2011), most of the e¢ ciency gains on the way from public to pri-
vate ownership occur in the intermediate stage of corporatization. Furthermore,
we compare bus lines that have gone through a competitive tendering process
with bus lines that have been procured on performance-based negotiation for
the same company and year. Hence, we argue that all aspects not related to
the type of contract are held constant. Considering bus lines is also an improve-
ment compared to earlier studies because contract features are based on lines
rather than companies. Finally, we use a relatively rich set of controls, which
should limit the unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. Farsi et al., 2006; Cullmann et
al., 2012).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the main ndings of
the literature on cost e¢ ciency in public transportation industries related to
contracting. Section 3 provides an overview of the reform and the institutional
setting. In Section 4, we specify the model and present the econometric ap-
proach. Section 5 deals with the data. The estimation results are discussed in
Section 6, together with cost-e¢ ciency measures. We draw some conclusions in
Section 7.
2 Competitive tendering versus performance-based
negotiation in transportation services
The economic literature is rich of studies on cost e¢ ciency in public trans-
portation industries (railways, bus or ferry lines) related to di¤erent contracting
regimes (tendering vs. negotiation). However, to the best of our knowledge,
only few studies try to isolate the e¤ects of changes in the contractual regime
from other simultaneous changes or organizational di¤erences that may a¤ect
the outcome of the contractual regime.
A review of successes and failures of competitive tendering worldwide is given
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by Hensher and Wallis (2005).1 The authors nd evidence of considerable cost
savings in the short and medium term. However, they point at four main limita-
tions of previous studies. First, the measurement of savings is inconsistent since
countries have di¤erent legal backgrounds, and changes in service and quality
levels and institutional restructuring are simultaneous with the introduction of
the new contractual regime. Second, in most of the cases, only rst round ef-
fects net of administrative costs are reported. However, costs of retendering
may increase due to unreasonable low initial tender prices and a decreasing
number of competitors (Wallis et al., 2010; Hensher and Stanley, 2010). Also,
competitive tendering may generate administrative costs to operators and reg-
ulators (Hensher, 1988; Saussier et al., 2009; Gil and Marion, 2012; Yescombe,
2007). Third, most of the studies focus primarily on cost savings rather than
on value for money. This leads to perverse incentives since external benets are
not taken into account, and companies may underestimate the true operating
costs to win the race (Armstrong and Sappington, 2006). Finally, Hensher and
Wallis object that competitive tendering may be exposed to regulatory capture
by powerful providers. As competitive tendering fosters market concentration
(Mathisen and Solvoll, 2008; Amaral et al., 2009; 2010; Yvrande-Billon, 2006;
Augustin and Walter, 2010), this risk becomes more severe in the long run.
Negotiated contracts or yardstick competition as proposed by Shleifer (1985)
can approximate competitive tendering outcomes if they are benchmarked to
best practice context-specic costs (Stanley and van de Velde, 2008; Yvrande-
Billon, 2006). Performance-based negotiation can also avoid some drawbacks of
competitive tendering, such as asymmetric information, high transaction costs,
lack of trust, and hold-up problems between the incumbent and the public au-
thority. Finally, service quality seem to be much more di¢ cult to specify in
1See also Alexandersson and Hultén (2006), Smith et al. (2010), Merkert (2010) for compet-
itive tendering in the railway sector; Baird and Wilmsmeier (2011) for tendering of European
ferry lines.
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competitive tendering contracts (Hensher and Stanley, 2008; Tadelis and Ba-
jari, 2006).
Wallis et al. (2010) underline that the choice between competitive tendering
and performance-based negotiation crucially depend on specic circumstances.
Among other things, the authors highlight the need for periodic market testing
through competitive tendering in order to provide outside information on bench-
marking costs as an input to any negotiation strategy. Competitive tendering
can then be used when bus companies with performance-based negotiated con-
tracts do not achieve the expected performance or the regulators commitment
power is limited (Armstrong and Sappington, 2007).
A tendency to cost convergence between competitively tendered contracts
and performance-based negotiated contracts has been observed in Australia
(Wallis et al., 2010). This underlines that the two approaches may be al-
ternative, particularly when monopolists operate in distinct geographic areas
(Armstrong and Sappington, 2006).
Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) estimate the impact of the contractual regime
and the ownership simultaneously on the level of technical e¢ ciency for a panel
of French urban transportation networks. Private bus companies under a com-
petitive tendering regime appear to be the more e¢ cient as compared to public
bus companies under xed contracts and cost-plus contracts. Piacenza (2006)
draws a similar conclusion for the Italian bus market. However, the e¤ect of the
ownership for private bus companies is likely to be bias by the e¤ect of compet-
itive tendering. Other studies compare levels of cost e¢ ciency between public
and private bus companies, although the impact of di¤erent contractual regimes
is not considered. Public bus companies appear to be signicantly less e¢ -
cient than private companies in Japan (Mizutani and Urakami, 2003), whereas
weak di¤erences are found in Portugal (Pestana Barros and Peypoch, 2010) and
Switzerland (Filippini and Prioni, 2003).
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Cambini et al. (2011) show that corporatization of local public bus compa-
nies in Italy may be an e¤ective way to improve e¢ ciency.2 On the other hand,
as suggested by Filippini and Prioni (1994) and Nieswand and Walter (2010),
public bus companies decrease their level of cost e¢ ciency in response to sub-
sidies. The e¤ect of competitive tendering on operating costs and subsidies is
examined by Bekken et al. (2006), who focus on the Norwegian bus industry.
The authors nd that competitive tendering reduces total costs by about 10%.
These savings are relatively low compared to other countries, which may be
explained by institutional changes and e¢ ciency improvements realized before
the introduction of competitive tendering (Dalen and Goméz-Lobo, 2003).
Studies above generally lack in two respects. First, they fail to separate
the impact of changes in the institutional form from the impact of changes in
the contractual regime. Second, the issue of unobserved heterogeneity is not
thoroughly addressed. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical study has
examined di¤erences in levels of cost e¢ ciency for bus lines operated under
competitively tendered contracts and bus lines operated under performance-
based negotiated contracts.
3 Institutional background and reform
In Switzerland, cantonal governments are responsible for the organization of
regional public bus transportation services.3 Hence, cantons dene bus lines
linking urban transportation networks, railway lines and rural villages that are
part of the public transportation network. They stipulate a contract with a
passenger transportation company for the supply of transport services on specic
bus lines. The bus line network is wide and operated by more than hundred
companies. However, the network is dominated by one large bus company,
2Corporatization refers to the transformation of public enterprises to limited liability public
companies.
3Switzerland is a confederation made of 26 cantons and about 2500 municipalities.
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Postbus Switzerland Ltd. The company operates more than 800 routes on a
network of about 10,000 km length, serving more than 100 million passengers,
which represents about 60% market share (LITRA, 2014; Weidmann et al.,
2011). These lines include school bus lines, night lines, pure touristic lines, ski-
bus lines, dial-a-bus lines, extra trip lines, and substitution lines for temporarily
interrupted railway lines.
Subsequent to the revision of the Swiss railways act in 1996, the public
authority was allowed to put lines out to tender in order to impose competitive
pressure on passenger transportation companies.4 During the last fteen years,
the governments of most Swiss cantons have exercised their right and put some
bus lines out to tender.5 About 10% of Postbus lines have gone through a
competitive tendering process during the last decade.
Before the reform, passenger transportation companies were compensated
for decits at the end of the operating period, i.e. tari¤s were regulated and an
automatic ex post coverage of the decit by the state was in place. According
to the revised acts, however, companies are given the opportunity to claim for
decit coverage ex ante, subject to required quality and performance constraints.
If the decit is reasonable according to some benchmarking indicators, then the
public authority can negotiate and nally procure the service.
Competitive tendering processes in Switzerland aim at nding a passenger
transportation company that operates a bus line, or a bundle of contiguous bus
lines, at best value for money, i.e. at the best price-performance ratio. Price cri-
4The terms competitive contracting, competitive bidding and franchise bidding (or similar
versions) are synonyms for competitive tendering used in this study.
5The railway act leaves the organization and the design of the competitive tendering process
open to the cantonal laws or to the interpretation of cantonal authorities. In order to provide
a minimum legal framework, federal authorities set guidelines (BAV, 2003). These guidelines
are not normative de jure, but they achieve de facto some normative character since contents
and subjects are usually listed as conditions in the competitive tendering documents. How-
ever, these guidelines are displaced by legal ordinances in the context of the ongoing reform
on the acts concerning railways and public passenger transportations (Bahnreform II, see
Bundesversammlung, 2010). Although the reform does not change the competitive tendering
process, it improves legal certainty.
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teria include variable and xed compensation payments, and account for 40% in
the contractual decision. Usually, the level of variable compensation payments is
relatively rigid. The remaining 60% pertains to performance criteria and quality
aspects that comprise the following main dimensions: driving training as well
as language skills and local knowledge of the employees; security, convenience,
maintenance and ecological aspects of the bus eet; and nally company man-
agement, marketing aspects and the overall picture of the applicant. Additional
performance criteria, such as environmental, working standards, and willingness
to participate in tari¤ and timetable systems, are mandatory for all applicants.
Other important rules apply for the transfer of employees, buses, and other cap-
ital equipment in case of operator change. Thereby, the main focus of the law
is on employees protection and avoidance of stranded investments. Generally,
the winner of the competitive tendering process is provided a license to operate
bus lines exclusively for ten years. The company is bound to its o¤er for the
rst four years of contract at least. In the following period, changes in external
factors, such as the demand, can be asserted.
Despite the possibility to put bus lines in a competitive tendering process,
the majority of bus lines are still procured by performance-based negotiated
contracts. Performance-based negotiated contracts are renewed annually subject
to simple benchmarking indicators, including the most important quality aspects
and operating ratios (total costs, revenues per passenger kilometers, revenue-
to-cost ratio, compensation payments per year and per passenger kilometers,
average passengers on a bus, etc.). The renewal of the contract depends on the
justication of these ex-ante planned benchmarking indicators. By the end of
the year (ex-post), bus companies must give account of benchmarking indicators.
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4 Model specication and estimation methods
In order to analyze the impact of the contractual regime on costs and cost
e¢ ciency of bus lines, we adopt a cost frontier approach. Within this approach,
we apply two empirical strategies. The rst empirical strategy is based on the
estimation of a stochastic cost frontier model as proposed by Battese and Coelli
(1995), where the mean of the cost ine¢ ciency term is a function of a dummy
variable indicating the contractual regime. The second strategy is characterized
by two stages. In the rst stage, we estimate a stochastic cost frontier model
as proposed by Aigner et al. (1977). In the second stage, the levels of cost
e¢ ciency of the two contractual regimes are compared using a Kruskal-Wallis
equality-of-populations test (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952).
We specify a cross-sectional total cost frontier model where total operating
cost of a bus line (C) is a function of output and output characteristics, two
inputs, and the contractual regime.6 Under the assumption of cost-minimizing
behavior of bus line managers and convex production technology, we can write
the model as follows:
C = f (Q;PL; PC ; PF ; L; S; T;N; dT ) : (1)
The output (Q) is measured by passenger kilometers. Equation (1) includes
two input price variables: PL is the price of labor, PC is the price of capital,
and PF is the fuel price.. To capture possible heterogeneity among bus lines,
additional variables have been included. Therefore, L is a load factor and S rep-
resents the average travelling speed. Also, T and N stand for the average trip
length and network length, respectively. Finally, dT is a dummy variable indi-
cating the contractual regime, i.e. if a bus line is operated under a competitively
tendered contract (dT = 1) or under a performance-based negotiated contract
6The use of panel data would be preferred from an econometric point of view. Unfortunately,
data at bus line level are available just for one year.
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(dT = 0). We refer the reader to Section 5 for a more detailed description of
variables and data.
For the estimation of the model dened by Equation (1), we specify a translog
functional form. This was initially proposed by Christensen et al. (1973) and
applied in numerous empirical studies in production economics. The advantages
of the translog functional form lies in the exibility and the straightforward
imposition of the linear homogeneity restriction.7 ;8 In the non-homothetic form,
the total cost frontier model with translog functional form can be written as:9
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where the subscript i denotes bus lines i = 1; 2; : : : ; I, and "i is the compos-
ite error term, consisting of the ine¢ ciency i and the random error i. We
7The following restrictions are necessary to guarantee linear homogeneity in inputs:P
r Pr = 1,
P
r=1
P
s=1 PCrPCs = 0, and
P
r rm = 0 for all values m. Linear homo-
geneity implies C(tP ;Q) = tC(P ;Q) for any t > 0. Therefore, one of the inputs, say PC , can
be arbitrarily chosen and set t = 1=PC . Then, one obtains C(P ;Q)=PC = C(P =PC ;Q).
8Following Jehle and Reny (2001), a cost function conforms to neoclassical microeconomic
theory if it is (a) non-negative and non-decreasing in input prices and output, (b) linearly
homogeneous, concave and continuous in input prices.
9A cost function is non-homothetic if input prices depend on output levels, hence if input
prices and output levels are not separable. In contrast, a homothetic cost function is separable
in prices and output: C(P ;Q) = h(Q)c(P ). Further properties of the translog functional form
are symmetry (mn = nm) and positivity (m  0). The translog functional form requires
every unit to have strictly positive outputs.
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dropped the fuel price (PF ) because this is constant across the country. Since
the translog functional form is a second order Taylor-approximation, the values
of the explanatory variables must be normalized to the approximation point.
For this purpose, we choose the median value of variables.10
Our rst empirical strategy (Model I ) is based on the estimation of a sto-
chastic cost frontier model, where a dummy variable for the contractual regime
(dT ) allows some heterogeneity in the mean cost e¢ ciency. Hence, the mean of
the cost ine¢ ciency () is distributed as: i s N + (dTdT; 2). This strategy
is estimated in one stage.
The second strategy (Model II ) is made of two stages. The rst stage es-
timates a stochastic cost frontier model assuming that all bus lines share the
same total cost function. The assumption is reasonable since the production
technology does not depend on the underlying contract. The question remains
as to whether levels of cost e¢ ciency depend on the contractual regime, i.e.
whether cost e¢ ciency of competitively tendered and performance-based nego-
tiated bus lines are statistically di¤erent. Following Singh and Coelli (2001), this
is evaluated in the second stage of the approach by means of the Kruskal-Wallis
equality-of-populations test.
The ine¢ ciency (i) is estimated using the conditional expectation function,
E(i j "i), as proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982). The level of cost e¢ ciency of
bus line i (CEi) can then be measured by the ratio between the cost frontier
and the actual costs as:
CEi =
lnCfrontier
lnCi
= exp ( E [ j "i]) ; (5)
where Cfrontier indicates the costs of an e¢ cient company. Hence, CEi takes
values between 0 and 1, 0:8 implying a level of cost e¢ ciency of 80%. Table 2
summarizes the econometric specications of the two models used in the study.
10The median value is preferred to the mean value as an approximation point since it is less
a¤ected by outliers.
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5 Data
This study is based on cross-sectional data with information on about 630 bus
lines operated by Postbus under the Swiss railways act during 2009. Some of
these lines are excluded from the analysis due to missing values in the variables
of interest or unclear di¤erentiation between standard bus lines and dial-a-bus
and night lines. None of the remaining 568 bus lines is identied as outlier ac-
cording to Cooks distance (Cook, 1977). All lines are operated year-round and
seven days a week. This means that school bus lines, night lines, pure touris-
tic lines, ski-bus lines, dial-a-bus lines, extra trip lines, and substitution lines
for temporarily interrupted railway lines are excluded from the data. The data
consists almost exclusively of rural bus lines, sometimes connected to suburbs,
and occasionally linked to intra-urban public tra¢ c transportation nodes. Ac-
cording to the contractual regime, bus lines are classied in two groups. The
majority, namely 522, are operated under performance-based negotiated con-
tracts, whereas 46 are featured with a competitively tendered contract.
Data are relatively homogeneous and include a rich set of explanatory vari-
ables. In addition to usual information on input prices, output and load factor,
we dispose of average travelling speed, trip length and network length, which
account for a good portion of the remaining heterogeneity in the data (see Table
?? for summary statistics). Therefore, the unobserved heterogeneity problem
discussed by Farsi et al. (2006) and Cullmann et al. (2012) is expected to be
negligible in our empirical exercise.
Total costs (C) include expenditure for buses and infrastructure as well as
for labor, fuel and capital depreciation, and are measured in Swiss Francs. To-
tal costs vary by a factor of about fteen among bus lines. The output (Q)
reects the demand and is measured by passenger kilometers, used also in sim-
ilar studies.11 Other authors use supply-related output measures such as seat
11See, for instance, Windle (1988), Deb and Filippini (2011), Bhattacharyya et al. (1995),
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or bus kilometers.12 De Borger and Kerstens (2008) note that both supply and
demand related output measures are relevant. However, the distinction is im-
portant when measuring the output of companies operating less frequented bus
lines. Generally, a load factor can be applied to control for the mismatch be-
tween consumption and production. However, demand remains an important
cost driver of bus cleaning and operational asset depreciation, among others.
Therefore, we use a demand-related output measure. Also, we argue that pro-
duction should be adapted to real demand unless reserve capacity is desired
by public authorities to guarantee a certain quality level, even in the case of
exceptionally high demand in the short-term. Otherwise, inadequate choices
of transportation would not be identied as cost ine¢ ciency. Even worse, the
most e¢ cient bus companies would be those operating big empty buses (Roy
and Yvrande-Billon, 2007). Certainly, intra-day excess capacity arises because
of uctuating demand caused by commuters (peak load). To replace buses sev-
eral times a day would be ine¢ cient. This constraint is considered by the input
price variable for capital and a load factor.
Two di¤erent input prices, dened as expenditures per factor unit, are in-
cluded in the model. The input price of labor (PL) is dened by the labor
expenses per full-time equivalent. In our sample, labor expenses account for
about half of total costs. The input price of capital (PC) is a residual price ap-
proximated by the non-labor expenses per bus kilometer, following Friedlaender
and Wang Chiang (1983).13 Non-labor expenses consist mainly of costs related
and Jha and Singh (2001). Similarly, the number of passenger trips is used in an earlier study
by Berechman (1987).
12For seat kilometers, see Farsi et al. (2006), Cambini et al. (2011), Walter (2010, 2011).
For bus kilometers, see Wang Chiang and Chen (2005), Ottoz et al. (2009), and Sakai and
Shoji (2010).
13Bus kilometers are determined by multiplying the number of buses on a given network by
the average length of their trips. Consequently, our unit price of capital is the price of moving
a bus over one kilometer. Usually buses are discharged after a certain operating distance, as
maintenance starts to be too costly. As a result, buses drive similar distances during their life
cycle.
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to capital expenditure of buses such as interests, depreciation and maintenance.
The capital stock apart from the rolling stock is negligible, and the fuel price is
constant through all observations. Hence, the residual price method can plausi-
bly approximate the input price for capital.
Two additional output characteristics are included. Following Windle (1988)
and many authors modelling output by passenger kilometers, we use passenger
kilometers per seat kilometers as load factor (L). This accounts for scheduled
buses with low demand, e.g. intra-day excess capacity or low demand in remote
areas. Therefore, the load factor is expected to have a negative impact on total
costs. Also, we consider the average trip length (T ). The longer the average
passenger trip, the lower the costs associated with bus stops.14
We add two variables on environmental conditions of bus lines. Similarly
to Fraquelli et al. (2004) and Piacenza (2006), we measure the average trav-
elling speed (S) by operative bus kilometers per operative working hours of
bus drivers. This is a typical quality indicator predetermined by the schedule,
which reects di¤erent local tra¢ c and geographic conditions. From the demand
side, the time of transfer a¤ects the choice of transportation modes. From the
supply side, tra¢ c and other geographic conditions a¤ect working hours and
capital requirements (Gagnepain, 1998). Therefore, total costs are expected to
decrease with the average travelling speed. The second variable is the size of
the network, measured by the network length (N). This accounts for either the
boundaries of the geographic area or the public service obligations determined
by the authority.15 Likely, the size of the network will increase total costs.
14Mohring (1972) shows this relationship in an article on scale e¤ects and the dependency
of demand, waiting time and frequency.
15Several studies use this measure. See, for instance, Cullmann et al. (2012), and Roy and
Yvrande-Billon (2007). Other authors argue that the appropriate measure to account for scale
e¤ects is the number of stops (e.g. Jara-Díaz et al., 2001).
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6 Results
The regression results of the two models specied in Equation (2) are presented
in Table 3. Preliminary regressions were conducted including the year of the
tender, as some of the tenders took place a few years before 2009. The idea was
to capture the diminishing e¤ect of the tender over the years due to possible
modications in the length of bus lines, number of bus routes, o¤-peak supply,
or passenger frequency. As suggested by Dalen and Goméz-Lobo (2003), ensuing
negotiations may have weakening e¤ects on contracts. Since this e¤ect was not
substantiated by the data, we dropped the year of tender in nal regressions.
Finally, we considered dummy variables to account for other geographical and
cultural di¤erences (alpine and linguistic regions) in bus lines. Since most of
these di¤erences are already captured by other variables and preliminary results
were not robust, we excluded these variables from nal regressions.
Generally, the estimated coe¢ cients and the rst-order terms show the ex-
pected signs and are statistically signicant. Furthermore, the coe¢ cients are
of similar magnitude in all models. Since variables are in natural logarithms,
the estimated coe¢ cients can be interpreted as cost elasticities at the approxi-
mation point. For example, a rise in average travelling speed (S) by one percent
reduces total costs by about 0.34 percent in both models.
The coe¢ cients of output (Q) are about 0.68, which is comparable to the
result of other studies using passenger kilometers as a measure of output. Note
also that standard errors are relatively low in both models. This suggests that
passenger kilometers is a reasonable measure of output. The coe¢ cients of
input prices (PC=PL) indicate that di¤erences among bus lines can be partially
explained by variations in input prices, either capital or labor. Furthermore, the
total cost function is concave in input prices at the approximation point.16 This
16For a translog cost function, the concavity condition is satised if the Hessian matrix of the
second derivatives of total costs with respect to the input prices, @
2 lnC
@ lnPj@Pi
, is negatively semi-
denite, i.e. if the eigenvalues of the matrix are non-positive. In our analysis with two input
16
means that management strategies are responsive to changes in input prices.
In other words, managers exhibit cost-minimizing behaviour, as predicted by
the theory. Since we imposed homogeneity in input prices and symmetry in
second-order terms, the estimated total cost frontiers satisfy the conditions for
theoretical validity of a total cost frontier model.17
Total costs are lower for bus lines with higher average travelling speed (S).
This e¤ect is amplied by negative second-order coe¢ cients. The coe¢ cients of
the load factor (L) are also negative. Cost elasticity to load factor is much higher
than cost elasticity to travelling speed. However, this e¤ect is mitigated by
positive second-order coe¢ cients. Combining the coe¢ cients of output and load
factor suggests high returns to passenger density.18 As predicted, the coe¢ cients
of trip length (T ) exhibit a negative sign. Conversely, network length (N) has
a positive but modest e¤ect on costs. Together with the coe¢ cient of output,
this estimated coe¢ cient suggests relatively low returns to scale. The signal-to-
noise ratio () is about 0.76 and signicant in both models, meaning that the
standard errors of the cost e¢ ciency terms are slightly larger than those of the
noise terms.
In Model I, the coe¢ cient of the dummy variable indicating the contractual
regime (dT ) is positive, but not signicant. This suggests that the level of cost
e¢ ciency is not inuenced by the contractual regime. Our second empirical
strategy is based on the results of Model II and the application of the Kruskal-
Wallis test, which ranks levels of cost e¢ ciency for the two groups (contractual
regimes). The null hypothesis of the test is that there is no statistical di¤erence
prices and linear homogeneity imposed, the Hessian matrix reduces to H =

PP
 PP
 PP
PP

.
17 In theory, a valid total cost frontier should be (i) non-negative, (ii) non-decreasing in input
prices and output, (iii) linearly homogeneous, and (iv ) concave in input prices.
18Following Windle (1988), returns to passenger density at the approximation point of
a translog cost function are given by the inverse of the sum of both coe¢ cients, i.e. by
@ lnC
@ lnQ
+ @ lnC
@ lnL
 1
= (0:686   0:502) 1 = 5:42 for Model II. Returns to scale are given by
@ lnC
@ lnQ
+ @ lnC
@ lnN
 1
= (0:686 + 0:133) 1 = 1:22.
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between the two sample groups. The results of the test indicate that we cannot
reject the hypothesis of equal distribution of the groups, and are summarized in
Table 5. These results conrm those obtained in Model I.
A descriptive summary of the level of cost e¢ ciency obtained from the two
models under di¤erent contractual regimes is given in Table 4. Cost e¢ ciency
scores generated by the two models are highly correlated (see Table 6). The
average level of cost e¢ ciency is relatively high. However, the minimum values
and the values of the 10th percentile indicate the presence of bus lines charac-
terized by a relatively low level of cost e¢ ciency. In conclusion, di¤erences in
the values of cost e¢ ciency among bus lines operating under di¤erent contrac-
tual regimes are relatively small. Therefore, we can argue that cost e¢ ciency of
competitively tendered bus lines is not statistically di¤erent from cost e¢ ciency
of performance-based negotiated bus lines.
7 Conclusions
The revision of the Swiss railways act and its legal ordinances in 1996 induced
a fundamental change in the public passenger transportation market. Among
other things, regional public authorities were given the choice between two di¤er-
ent contractual regimes to procure public passenger transport services: compet-
itive tendering and performance-based negotiation. The more recent revisions
of these acts (Bahnreform II, see Bundesversammlung, 2010) address, among
other things, procurement processes of public passenger transportation services.
Therefore, information on the e¤ects of di¤erent contractual regimes on costs
is of relevance for both policy makers and purchasers. Through this study, we
investigated levels of cost e¢ ciency of bus lines operated in the Swiss public bus
transportation industry under di¤erent contractual regimes.
We estimated a translog total cost frontier model using cross-sectional data
on 568 bus lines operated by the main bus operator (Postbus) in the year 2009.
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We applied two di¤erent empirical strategies. Through the rst strategy, we
evaluated di¤erences in the levels of cost e¢ ciency between the contractual
regimes using a dummy variable included in the mean of the cost ine¢ ciency.
The second strategy is made of two stages. Firstly, a stochastic cost frontier
model was estimated. Then, a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations test was
applied to assess di¤erences in the ranking of the levels of cost e¢ ciency between
the two contractual regimes.
Our empirical results show that the average levels of cost e¢ ciency are rela-
tively high and no signicant di¤erences are observed between competitive ten-
dering and performance-based negotiation. Both contractual regimes enforced
in Switzerland are incentive regulation schemes. The current practice of using
both contractual regimes is challenging for the operators of bus lines in terms
of competitive pressure. As stated by Hensher and Wallis (2005), some of the
negative e¤ects of negotiation (e.g. high compensation payments) and compet-
itive tendering (e.g. high administrative costs) can be avoided. The possibility
of using the competitive tendering may have a disciplining e¤ect on negotiation
since it is a credible threat. This threat prevents bus companies from bargaining
inadequate rents for bus lines and inducing asymmetric information advantages.
This argument is also supported by the recent evidence of cost convergence be-
tween competitive tendering and negotiated contracting in Australia (Hensher
and Stanley, 2010).
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Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Total costs (C) in Swiss francs 725,187 769,468
Passenger kilometers (Q) 1,093,431 1,926,202
Price of labour (PL) in Swiss francs 51.53 5.35
Price of capital (PC) in Swiss francs 3.22 1.04
Average travelling speed (S) in km/h 21.08 6.88
Load factor (L) in passenger km per seat km 1 0.6
Average trip length (T ) in km 6.13 3.38
Network length (N) in km 12.38 8.88
Competitive tendering (dT = 1; 0 otherwise) 0.08 0.27
Notes: number of observations n=568; normalized values (mean=1).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of total costs, output and input variables.
Model I Model II
SFA + dummy f(i) SFA
dT Function of the mean ine¢ ciency Not included
"i = i + i "i = i + i
Composite error ("i) i  N+(dT dT; 2) i  N+(0; 2)
i  N(0; 2) i  N(0; 2)
Ine¢ ciency E [i j "i] E [i j "i]
Level of e¢ ciency exp ( E [i j "i]) exp ( E [i j "i])
Kruskal-Wallis test no yes
Table 2: Econometric specications.
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Model I Model II
SFA+ dummy f(i) SFA
Coe¢ cients Std. Err. Coe¢ cients Std. Err.
Passenger kilometers (Q) 0.6862 0.016 0.6864 0.014
Input price ratio (P ) 0.7932 0.058 0.7931 0.045
Average travelling speed (S) -0.3432 0.058 -0.3437 0.049
Load factor (L) -0.5015 0.040 -0.5020 0.038
Average trip length (T ) -0.1278 0.046 -0.1291 0.037
Network length (N) 0.1323 0.039 0.1330 0.029
(QQ) 0.1256 0.018 0.1251 0.016
(PP ) -0.1350 0.064 -0.1327 0.048
(SS) -0.3492 0.204 -0.3450 0.205
(LL) 0.2936 0.049 0.2920 0.049
(TT ) -0.1599 0.145 -0.1513 0.137
(NN) -0.0396 0.094 -0.0347 0.084
(QP ) -0.0929 0.040 -0.0955 0.032
(QS) -0.0081 0.050 -0.0059 0.039
(QL) -0.1649 0.031 -0.1644 0.028
(QT ) -0.0309 0.039 -0.0314 0.033
(QN) 0.0299 0.041 0.0299 0.029
(PS) 0.5663 0.153 0.5621 0.148
(PL) 0.1813 0.053 0.1834 0.059
(PT ) -0.0919 0.102 -0.0889 0.112
(PN) 0.0835 0.075 0.0868 0.063
(SL) 0.1013 0.064 0.1001 0.068
(ST ) 0.0012 0.094 0.0000 0.114
(SN) -0.2019 0.087 -0.2096 0.096
(LT ) 0.0663 0.061 0.0649 0.063
(LN) -0.0141 0.057 -0.0150 0.060
(TN) 0.1005 0.076 0.0984 0.077
dT as f(i) 0.0433 0.110
Constant 11.7335 0.051 11.7340 0.060
2 = 2 + 
2
 0.0683
 0.012 0.0687 0.015
 = 22 0.7632 0.342 0.7672 0.089
*, **, ***: signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%; number of observations: n=568.
Table 3: Estimation results.
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Model I Model II
SFA+ dummy f(i) SFA
Contractual regime Performance-based Competitive Performance-based Competitive
negotiation tendering negotiation tendering
Mean 0.8822 0.8757 0.8818 0.8791
Standard deviation 0.0360 0.0401 0.0363 0.0367
Minimum 0.6356 0.7652 0.6321 0.7756
10th percentile 0.8401 0.8347 0.8394 0.8419
1st quantile 0.8694 0.8568 0.8688 0.8618
Median 0.8886 0.8778 0.8881 0.8828
3rd quantile 0.9040 0.8976 0.9036 0.8989
90th percentile 0.9171 0.9292 0.9168 0.9279
Maximum 0.9653 0.9470 0.9652 0.9432
Number of observations: n=568.
Table 4: Cost e¢ ciency scores.
Model II
SFA
Contractual regime Performance-based negotiation Competitive tendering
Average rank 282 305
H0: e¤(dT=0) = e¤(dT=1) not rejected
P -value 0.349
Lower e¢ ciency values are assigned to higher ranks; ***, **, *: signicant at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively; number of observations: n=568.
Table 5: Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-population test (cost e¢ ciency scores).
Model I Model II
SFA+ dummy f(i) SFA
Model I 1 0.9994
Model II 0.9992 1
Note: correlation of e¢ ciency scores in the lower triangle matrix, Spearman rank correlation in the
upper triangle matrix; ***, **, *: signicant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; number of observations:
n=568.
Table 6: Correlation of cost e¢ ciency scores (upper triangle matrix) and Spear-
man rank correlation (lower triangle matrix).
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